

# Banking Union: State of Play and Challenges Ahead

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
### Outline

- Overview
- SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
- SRB Single Resolution Board
- EDIS European Deposit Insureance Scheme
- Outlook





### The Eurozone and the Banking Union





### **Key Elements of the Banking Union**




Single Rulebook EU28 CRR/CRD IV BRRD DGSD



### SSM



### **Overview of the Single Supervisory Mechanism**





### Key tasks conferred on the ECB

- **Significant banks** >30bn assets; >20% national GDP; 3 most important banks, significance of cross-border activites
- Licence authorization and withdrawal
- Requirements on capital, leverage, liquidity, and governance
- Consolidated supervision and supervision of conglomerates
- **Intervention measures** where a bank breaches requirements (coordinating with resolution authorities)
- Macroprudential tasks
- **Structural** reforms: Mandate separation of trading activities.
  - All tasks not explicitly conferred on the ECB are exercised by national supervisors



### **SRM**



### **Scope of Single Resolution Mechanism**


**Mirrors the SSM:** <u>all banks</u> established in the Euro Area and other participating Member States

#### **Distribution of tasks between SRB and NRAs**:

- Board directly responsible for <u>cross-border</u> and <u>significant banks</u> (>30bn; about 200 banks)
- NRAs responsible for <u>all other banks</u> (also to adopt resolution decisions if no use of the Fund is required)

SRB ultimately responsible for **all banks** 







## **SRB: Triggering resolution in practice**

#### ECB generally **determines**

- bank is failing/likely to fail
  - o <u>Board may also decide</u> if it informed ECB, and ECB has not reacted within 3 days

#### Board **assesses**

- systemic threat (public interest) and
- no alternative private solution

#### Board **adopts**

resolution scheme: necessary resolution and funding measures

Resolution scheme is submitted to Commission/Council (24 hours) for *endorsement* or *objection*.



# **SRF: Bridge financing**

- Resolution funding
  - ➢ needs to be available immediately,
  - even as long as SRF is still being filled by banking sector contributions
- Each Member State backs the national compartment in the SRF
- No mutualisation
- Commitment to introduce common backstop by the time the SRF is fully mutualised at the latest (2024)



### **EDIS**




### **Key Principles of the Proposal**

- ➡ No claim from EDIS unless DGS ok on DGSD obligations
- Switching to EDIS won't imply higher costs for the banking sector overall
- All banks in BU covered, but risk-based contributions after Year 3
- Risk sharing to go along with risk reduction
- Gradual approach: necessary to address legacy issues and avoid moral hazard



### **Gradual approach for EDIS**





### **Re-Insurance**

- Risks remain largely national. This reduces moral hazard and addresses legacy.
- EDIS would only provide liquidity if the national DGS has exhausted its own resources and complies with DGSD obligations (e.g. capitalisation).
- □ There are other caps and safeguards to protect EDIS.




### **Co-Insurance**

- Co-Insurance is a further development of re-insurance.
- Main difference: The national DGS would not have to be exhausted before it can access EDIS.
- EDIS will cover some amount from the first euro that the national DGS pays out to its depositors. Risk is therefore partially mutualised.
- □ The degree of available EDIS cover would increase over four years until it is fully mutualised.




#### **Development of EDIS and national funds**

■ Participating DGS funds ■ EDIS funds



### Summary: Risk-reduction in the Banking Union





### Outlook

Discussions on banking union ongoing in Council and EP

- **EDIS** proposal
- SRF backstop
- further measures to reduce risk including tackling banksovereign link



# Thank you very much!

